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Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142
(1960) (Black, J., dissenting)
My ancestor . . . who signed the treaty . . . accepted the word of the United
States—that this treaty would protect not only the Indian way of life for those
living, but also for all generations yet unborn.
Jerry Meninick, Citizen of the Yakama Nation1
I. INTRODUCTION
The idiom goes that “Everything old is new again.”  This Article
examines whether the same can be said for federal Indian law.  For
centuries, tribes have relied on their treaties with the United States to
enforce such crucial rights as access to water, fish, and hunting areas.
Today, an environmental challenge looms over Indian country—cli-
mate change—prompting one to wonder whether such tribally revered
text, treaties, can be applied in new ways to provide a legal avenue
with the potential to alleviate the impact of climate change.
Climate change threatens the very territorial existence of tribes in
the United States.2  Tribes, who often rely closely on their environ-
ments for legal, spiritual, cultural, and subsistential reasons, have
been particularly hard hit by the negative impacts of climate change.
For example, in its Climate Adaptation Action Plan, the Swinomish
Indian Tribal Community3 details the projected impacts of climate
change on its reservation community, explaining that upwards of 15%
of its river uplands are subject to potential flooding, 160 residential
and 18 non-residential/commercial structures could be inundated,
2,218 acres and over 1,500 properties are at risk for wildfires, vital
1. Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands
and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39
TULSA L. REV. 355, 356 (2003) (citation omitted).
2. T.M. BULL BENNETT ET AL., Indigenous Peoples, Land, and Resources, in CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 297 (2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/64FU-BWS4 (detailing the impacts of climate change on indige-
nous peoples in the United States).
3. See OFFICE OF PLANNING & CMTY. DEV., SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., SWI-
NOMISH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE CLIMATE ADAPTATION ACTION PLAN 7 (2010),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/UYV4-7RZX [hereinafter SWINOMISH INDIAN
TRIBAL CMTY.] (“The Swinomish Indian Reservation is located on the southeast-
ern peninsula of Fidalgo Island, west of the Swinomish Channel and adjacent to
low-lying mainland areas of western Skagit County, in western Washing-
ton. . . . The Reservation encompasses approximately 7,450 upland acres and ap-
proximately 2,900 acres of tidelands for a total of 10,350 acres.  Roughly 4,700
acres are forested uplands with interspersed rural development and surrounding
urban development.  Approximately 7,675 acres are held by the Tribe or Tribal
members, with the remaining 2,675 acres held in private non-tribal owner-
ship. . . . There are upwards of 1,300 homes on the Reservation, and total Reser-
vation population is estimated at somewhat over 3,000 (approximately 2,600 as of
2000 census).”).
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transportation links are at risk for inundation, significant seafood and
shellfish areas are at risk of loss, the Tribe’s elders face significant
risk of heat-related illnesses, and the Tribe may lose sensitive cultural
sites and traditional native species.4  Ultimately, the Tribe concludes
that “[t]he principle areas and resources within the Swinomish Indian
reservation vulnerable to climate change impacts are shorelines,
beaches, low-lying terrain, and forests, along with the assets within
those areas.”5
Similarly, the Nez Perce Tribe also is facing profound impacts from
climate change:
Air temperatures in the region have increased about 1.5 °F during the 20th
century and models predict a future increase of +2.0 °F by 2020, +3.2 °F by
2040, and +5.3 °F by 2080 . . . . April 1st snowpack has decreased overall in
the Pacific Northwest, with losses . . . earlier in the spring throughout the
western United States, leading to reduced summer streamflows, increased
competition for water, vulnerability to drought, increases in summer water
temperatures and a higher risk of winter flooding.  The changes already being
seen are substantial, and by the end of the century [the Nez Perce Tribe] will
likely be facing unprecedented changes to [its] natural environment and the
economies that depend on it.6
Unfortunately, climate change exacerbates the environmental deg-
radation already facing many Native communities as a result of envi-
ronmental pollution, natural resource development, and sacred site
destruction.7  For many tribes, land constitutes more than dirt and
plants as, “[f]or Native peoples, land is often constitutive of cultural
identity.  Many Indian tribes, for example, identify their origin as a
distinct people with a particular geographic site.”8  For many tribes,
culture and spirituality can be connected to a specific area or piece of
land.  In some parts of the country, climate change threatens the very
land upon which Natives and tribes are located.9  In this way, climate
change threatens not only the territorial sovereignty of Indians and
tribes, but also tribal cultural sovereignty as well.  Accordingly, the
negative impacts of climate change that threaten the very land under-
lying some Native communities may be particularly hard on Native
4. Id. at 26.
5. Id.
6. KEN CLARK & JENIFER HARRIS, NEZ PERCE TRIBE WATER RESOURCES DIV., CLEAR-
WATER RIVER SUBBASIN (ID) CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN 9 (Toby Thaler &
Gwen Griffith eds., 2011), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/2YA5-5DAQ.
7. Id.
8. Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of
Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1640 (2000).
9. Chris Mooney, The Remote Alaskan Village that Needs to Be Relocated Due to
Climate Change, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2015/02/24/the-remote-alaskan-village-that-needs-
to-be-relocated-due-to-climate-change/, archived at  http://perma.unl.edu/4M5U-
5ZRG.
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communities, where land is the “linchpin” for survival.10  Land is also
of great importance to many tribes because “reservations are sanc-
tuaries where land is not subject to taxation; where individual Indians
are free of most taxes; where many state laws do not apply; and where
Indian customs and traditions are supreme.”11  Ultimately, land may
play a more important role in the lives of individual Indians and tribes
than it does for most non-Indians.12
Because of the important role that land and natural resources play
to many Native communities, advocates looking to protect such re-
sources from the negative impacts of climate change may look to trea-
ties and the federal trust responsibility.13  For example, in its Climate
Adaptation Action Plan, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community ex-
plains its goal to “[p]reserve [the] ability to fully exercise treaty rights
and cultural practices and to improve physical and spiritual health.”14
Additionally, the Nez Perce Tribe calls for a discussion of its treaty
rights and the resources protected by its treaties with the United
States in response to the negative impacts of climate change on those
rights.15
These references to tribal treaties rights within tribal climate
change adaptation planning documents raise the question of whether
treaty rights can be used to require the United States to protect im-
portant tribal resources threatened by climate change.  Given that
many treaties protect natural resources that are particularly hard hit
by climate change—such as fisheries, animals that are typically
hunted for subsistential purposes, and water16—enforcing treaty
rights may be a helpful legal tool to assist efforts to combat against
the negative impacts of climate change.  Development of such legal
tools may be particularly important because of the value of the envi-
ronment to many tribal communities and also because tribes may not
be otherwise included in state and regional discussions of how to com-
bat climate change.17  Because of the small size of some tribal commu-
nities, non-tribal governments may not focus on tribes and
10. Wood, supra note 1, at 356 (“While environmental disease may sooner or later
affect everyone in the United States, the impacts on Indian country are magni-
fied, because the land base is the linchpin for tribal survival.”).
11. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Ab-
rogation: “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long
a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 604–05 (1975) (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 605.
13. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 1, at 356 (“The trust responsibility should play a role
in protecting tribal lands and resources . . . .”).
14. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., supra note 3, at 51.
15. CLARK & HARRIS, supra note 6, at 55.
16. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 618–19.
17. Chairwoman Karen Driver, chairwoman of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Supe-
rior Chippewa in northern Minnesota, provided an example of how tribes were
not being included in local and state climate change planning:
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Natives18—leaving it to the communities themselves to develop their
own solutions to climate change.  Also, despite the fact that President
Obama has acknowledged the profound impacts of climate change on
tribal communities,19 it is highly unlikely that new federal laws will
be passed any time soon to assist tribes.20
Tribes may therefore want to reexamine existing legal tools, such
as treaties, to determine how such past precedent might be creatively
applied in the climate change context.  To date, little attention has
been paid to examine whether treaties may prove effective legal re-
sources for tribes seeking to protect valuable resources from the im-
pacts of climate change.  This Article therefore seeks to fill the
scholarly void and begin the conversation on the role that treaties may
play in providing tribes legal redress for the negative impacts of cli-
mate change.
Tribes exercising their treaty rights have found success in the past,
such as with the protection of water rights and fishing access, al-
though treaties have not previously been relied upon to protect re-
sources vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.  In general,
treaties have historically played an important role in many tribes, as
they have a profound cultural connection and are “a powerful testa-
ment to [tribes’] inherent sovereign authority has separate nations
and governments.”21  Accordingly, treaties may be used as expressions
of both political and cultural sovereignty because treaties were negoti-
ated between two separate sovereigns, the United States and tribes,
and because treaties often protect valuable cultural resources such as
tribal resources.22
She recounted how a recent flooding event underscored the feeling that
her community is left on its own during disasters.  Instead of achieving a
greater level of resilience, she said her band is “ghettoized.”  “Nobody
showed up” to help during the flood, Diver said.  “I was calling people
and saying, ‘Hey, I could use some evacuation assistance.’  And they’re
like, ‘Well, you’re not in our plan.’”
Evan Lehmann, White House Describes Climate Change Impacts as Symptom of
Inequality, EE NEWS (July 10, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/
1060021562/print, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/XB53-3J82.
18. Id. (quoting Chairwoman Karen Diver’s explanation that her community may be
deemed a “throwaway communit[y]” because it is too small to be included in state
and regional climate change planning).
19. Robin Bravender, Global Warming Threatens Tribes’ Survival, Culture—McCar-
thy, EE NEWS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/
1060009881/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QK6L-737X (quoting U.S. EPA
Administrator Gina McCarthy) (“President Obama sees climate as part of the
legacy issues that he wants to move forward to address, and he very clearly recog-
nizes that tribal issues are . . . driven in so many ways by the changing cli-
mate . . . and the tremendous impacts that that can have on both the ability of
tribes to survive, but also to maintain their culture.”).
20. Id.
21. Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1620.
22. Id. at 1621.
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Given the importance of treaties, this Article considers the enforce-
ability of the treaty rights themselves in the climate change context,
as well as how treaties might be utilized by tribes within the federal
trust relationship context.23  Historically, a federal trust responsibil-
ity exists between the United States and federally recognized tribes,
as tribes surrendered certain rights to the United States in exchange
for the federal government’s willingness to act in the best interests of
tribes.  Accordingly, when a tribe believes that the federal government
has not acted in its best interest, the tribe may bring a claim based on
an alleged breach of the federal trust responsibility.  Previously, tribes
have successfully claimed a breach of the federal trust responsibility
to protect tribal resources, and, moreover, such enforcement is impor-
tant to the protection of tribal resources.  As Professor Mary Christina
Wood explained, “Enforcement of the federal trust responsibility is
necessary to protect Native America from environmental assault.”24
In the climate change context, turning to the federal government for
potential protection against the negative impacts of climate change
may be particularly relevant given the pervasive role the federal gov-
ernment plays in Indian country.  For example, the federal govern-
ment owns naked fee title to land held in trust for tribes.25
To date, there has been little scholarly attention on whether tribal
treaties may be helpful legal tools in efforts to protect tribal natural
resources from the negative impacts of climate change.  This Article
fills the void by more closely examining how treaties may be applied in
the climate change context.  To do this, the Article starts by examin-
ing treaties and how they are interpreted.  Part II first focuses on the
treaty language of two tribes, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Commu-
nity and the Nez Perce Tribe, as these two Tribes contemplated the
use of their treaties as legal tools to protect their natural resources
from the impacts of climate change.  Part II then goes on to discuss
how treaties are typically interpreted, concluding with a discussion of
how the treaties of these two Tribes might be interpreted in relation to
protecting certain resources in the climate change era.  The Article
then turns to an examination of how such treaty claims might be
raised in federal courts.  Part III takes a close look at the federal trust
relationship and how a treaty claim might be used in conjunction with
a claim of a breach of the federal trust relationship.  Part III examines
potential claims under both domestic law and international law.  Ulti-
23. Admittedly, tension exists between the concepts of fully expressed tribal sover-
eignty and the federal trust relationship.  However, this antithetical relationship
is the cornerstone of the relationship between tribes and the federal government.
Accordingly, this Article considers the enforceability of tribal treaties themselves
as expressed by the sovereigns that negotiated them, and also within the context
of the federal trust relationship.
24. Wood, supra note 1, at 355.
25. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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mately, this Article concludes that it may be possible to successfully
use certain treaty provisions to require the United States to work to
protect tribal resources through enforcement of treaty provisions.  By
looking back to the historical rights attached to tribal treaties, tribes
may be able to apply such protections in a new fashion to combat the
negative impacts of climate change.
II. INTERPRETING TREATIES
Tribes have often turned to their treaties with the United States as
a way of protecting valuable rights.  For example, the Swinomish In-
dian Tribal Community successfully asserted its treaty rights to fish,
a “cultural keystone” for the Tribe, in the 1970s.26  Before examining
whether claims based on tribal treaty provisions might be helpful in
protecting tribal resources threatened by climate change, the first sec-
tion of this Part considers the specific language of two Tribes’ treaties:
the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community and Nez Perce Tribe.  With
the actual treaty language in hand, the next section examines how
treaty provisions are typically interpreted.  Finally, the last section
speculates as to how the relevant treaty language might be inter-
preted by a court examining such language to determine whether the
resources mentioned in the treaties that are threatened by climate
change are guaranteed by the treaty.  Ultimately, this Article con-
cludes that treaty language could exist that would protect such
threatened tribal resources in the climate change context.
Admittedly, the Article views treaty rights progressively.  This
would not be, however, the first time that tribal treaty rights are
viewed in such a manner.  Historically, federal courts have inter-
preted treaties in expansive and progressive ways given the time of
such decisions.  For example, in 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined that tribal treaties, which made no explicit mention of water
rights, reserved water rights sufficient for the primary purposes of a
reservation.27  Similarly, in 1974, the U.S. District Court for the West-
ern District of Washington determined that tribal treaties reserved
the right of tribes to be co-managers of fisheries along with the states,
despite the fact that the treaties involved did not explicitly reference
such a right to co-management.28  While these decisions are well-es-
tablished and respected today, they were groundbreaking and novel in
their time.  These decisions and others demonstrate the capacity for
federal courts to interpret treaties in broadly in order to protect tribal
resources, which is consistent with the Indian canons of construction
26. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., supra note 3, at 10 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
27. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
28. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
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discussed below.  Moreover, such decisions also demonstrate federal
courts’ willingness to demand specific action from the federal govern-
ment on the basis of implicit treaty provisions.  It is therefore not
outside the realm of possibility that a federal court would decide the
same in the context of climate change.
A. What Do the Relevant Treaties Say?
As mentioned above,29 at least two tribes—the Swinomish Indian
Tribal Community and the Nez Perce Tribe—specifically considered
their treaty rights within the context of climate change for the pur-
pose of protecting valuable natural resources from its deleterious ef-
fects.  Accordingly, in order to determine whether the Tribes may be
able to rely on their treaties with the United States to protect such
resources, it is helpful to first consider the language of these Tribes’
treaties.
1. Swinomish Indian Tribal Community
The United States and the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community
entered into the Treaty of Point Elliott on January 22, 1855.30  Article
I of the Treaty establishes cessation of lands to the United States.31
Article II, however, reserves lands “for the present use and occupation
of the said tribes and bands . . . .”32  Article II goes on to specify that:
All which tracts shall be set apart, and so far as necessary surveyed and
marked out for their [tribes’] exclusive use; nor shall any white man be per-
mitted to reside upon the same without permission of the said tribes or bands,
of the superintendent or agent, but, if necessary for the public convenience,
roads may be run through the said reserves, the Indians being compensated
for any damage thereby done them.33
This provision is notable for two reasons.  First, it is clear that the
land was reserved primarily to benefit the tribes, including the Swi-
nomish.  Second, despite the fact that the federal government reserved
the land for the “exclusive use” of the tribes, the federal government
still maintained control over the applicable lands by retaining the
right to give permission to non-Natives to settle on the lands and also
the right to develop roads, as necessary.  As discussed below,34 federal
29. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., supra note 3, at 51; CLARK & HARRIS, supra
note 6, at 55.
30. Treaty Between the United States and the Dwa´mish, Suqua´mish and Other Al-
lied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, Jan. 22, 1855, 12
Stat. 927 [hereinafter Treaty of Point Elliott].  The United States Senate ratified
the treaty on March 8, 1859, and President James Buchanan accepted, ratified,
and confirmed the same treaty on April 11, 1859. Id.
31. Id. at 927–28.
32. Id. at 928.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., infra subsection III.A.2 & note 147 and accompanying text.
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control is one factor courts evaluate when considering whether money
damages are available for a breach of a federal trust responsibility.35
Article V of the Treaty of Point Elliott is also notable, as it provides
that:
The right of taking fish at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is fur-
ther secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory, and
of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the priv-
ilege of hunting and gathering roots and berries on open and unclaimed
land.36
Such language recognizing a tribe’s right to take “fish at usual and
accustomed grounds and stations” is language commonly found in Ste-
vens treaties; a term often used to refer to treaties negotiated by Isaac
Ingalls Stevens, who was the Governor and Superintendent of Indian
Affairs in the Washington Territory in the 1850s.37  The meaning of
this language has been the subject of several court decisions, and, ulti-
mately, the United States Supreme Court determined that this treaty
language granted the tribes the right to take substantial portions of
available fish in common with non-tribal members.38  Because fish are
so important to many tribes, such as the Swinomish, similar provi-
sions to Article V were placed in many treaties in order to ensure tri-
bal access to such a valuable resource.39  In its Climate Adaptation
Action Plan, the Tribe explained the importance of fish and shellfish,
35. Admittedly, however, the type of federal control discussed in Article II is unlikely
to rise to the level of an enforceable trust relationship allowing the Tribe to re-
cover money damages. See infra p. subsection III.A.2 and note 147 and accompa-
nying text.
36. Treaty of Point Elliott, supra note 30, at 928.
37. The other Stevens treaties include: Treaty between the United States of America
and the S’Klallams Indians, Jan. 26, 1855, 12 Stat. 933 [hereinafter Treaty of
Point No Point]; Treaty between the United States of America and the Makah
Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Makah Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939 [hereinafter
Treaty of Neah Bay]; Treaty between the United States and the Walla-Walla,
Cayuses, and Umatilla Tribes and Bands of Indians in Washington and Oregon
Territories, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 945 [hereinafter Treaty with the Walla-Walla];
Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians, June 9,
1855, 12 Stat. 951 [hereinafter Treaty with the Yakamas]; Treaty between the
United States of America and the Nez Perce Indians, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957
[hereinafter 1855 Treaty with the Nez Perce]; Treaty between the United States
and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of Indians in Middle Oregon, June 25,
1855, 12 Stat. 963 [hereinafter Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon]; Treaty
between the United States and the Qui-nai-elt and Quil-leh-ute Indians., July 1,
1855, 12 Stat. 971 [hereinafter Treaty of Olympia]; Treaty between the United
States and the Flathead, Kootenay, and Upper Pend d’Oreilles Indians, July 16,
1855, 12 Stat. 975 [hereinafter Treaty with the Flatheads].
38. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
39. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., supra note 3, at 8, 10 (“Established in 1855 by
the Treaty of Point Elliott, the Swinomish Indian Reservation brought together
several Coast Salish groups who shared a culture centered on fishing, and a cere-
monial calendar revolving around cedar longhouses.”).
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as “[t]raditional foods such as salmon and shellfish are ‘cultural key-
stone’ aquatic species to the Tribe; much more than a food source,
these foods are a vital contribution to the cultural, spiritual, and social
life of tribal members.”40
Accordingly, Article V of the Treaty of Point Elliott protects a re-
source of profound importance to the Tribe and contemplates the con-
tinued access to this resource.  Given that climate change threatens
fish and shellfish,41 the Tribe’s ability to access this treaty-protected
resource is also threatened.  This therefore raises the question of
whether the treaty right can become the basis of an enforceable trust
claim, as discussed below.42
The Treaty of Point Elliott also provides for ongoing federal man-
agement of the established reservation.  For example, under Article
VII the President of the United States possesses the power to remove
the Tribe from the established reservation, and the federal govern-
ment has the authority under the Article to allot the reservation.43
Further, Article XIV declares that the federal government will estab-
lish a school for the reservation and provide certain infrastructure and
professionals, such as blacksmiths, carpenters, and teachers.44  While
it is unlikely that these Articles establish a federal trust relationship
mandating money damages for its breach, the Articles certainly cre-
ated a substantial federal presence on the reservation, allowing for
federal control over certain key governing functions—such as land dis-
tribution.  However, as discussed below,45 once it is determined that a
specific law exists wherein the federal government undertook the duty
to manage a resource, then courts consider whether the federal gov-
ernment exercises control over that resource.46  Such treaty provi-
sions, therefore, could be read as providing the federal government
control over the tribal resources negatively impacted by the impacts of
climate change, such as land.
2. Nez Perce Tribe
Like the Swinomish, the Nez Perce Tribe has also entered into
treaties with the United States.47  Of the several treaties entered into
between the United States and the Nez Perce, three are of interest for
purposes of this Article.  First, as a result of the Walla Walla Council,
the Nez Perce entered into a treaty with the federal government on
40. Id. at 10 (citation omitted).
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. See infra section III.A.
43. Treaty of Point Elliott, supra note 30, at 929.
44. Id. at 929–30.
45. See infra subsections III.A.2–4.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1983).
47. See, e.g., Treaty with the Blackfoot Indians, Oct. 17, 1855, 11 Stat. 657.
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June 11, 1855.48  Similar to the treaty between the Swinomish and
the United States, the 1855 Treaty between the Nez Perce and the
United States established a reservation for the “exclusive use and ben-
efit” of the Tribe.49  Also similar to the Treaty of Point Elliott, “The
exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams where running
through or bordering said reservation is further secured to said Indi-
ans.”50  And, furthermore, like the Treaty of Point Elliott, the Nez
Perce Treaty provides that the United States shall provide substantial
infrastructure development,51 as well as have control over the survey
and allotment of the reservation.52  Accordingly, the 1855 Treaty be-
tween the Nez Perce and the United States is very similar to the Swi-
nomish Treaty.
On June 9, 1863, the Nez Perce and the United States entered into
another treaty.53  The 1863 Treaty uses language somewhat different
from the 1855 Treaty.  For example, Article II of the Treaty speaks to
establishing a “home . . . for the sole use and occupation” of the
Tribe.54  Further, Article III of the Treaty provides extensive guidance
on how the land shall be allotted and distributed to individual mem-
bers of the Tribe.55  Like the 1855 Treaty, Article V states that the
federal government shall provide significant infrastructure develop-
ment, including construction of a school, hospital, blacksmith’s shop,
houses, and also provide certain professionals to assist on the reserva-
tion for a set period of time.56  Further, Article VIII says that the fed-
eral government shall have the right to develop roads, hotels, and
stage stands as necessary for the public good.57  Article VIII also es-
tablishes that the ferries and bridges on the reservation “shall be held
and managed for the benefit” of the Tribe, and that the “rents, profits,
and issues” resulting from federal regulation on the reservation “shall
inure to the benefit” of the Tribe.58  Under Article VIII, the federal
48. 1855 Treaty with the Nez Perce, supra note 37.  The United States Senate rati-
fied the treaty on March 8, 1859, and President James Buchanan accepted, rati-
fied, and confirmed the treaty on April 29, 1859. Id. at 962.
49. Id. at 957–58.
50. Id. at 958.
51. Id. at 959.
52. Id.
53. Treaty between the United States of America and the Nez Perce Tribe of Indians,
June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 [hereinafter 1867 Treaty with the Nez Perce].  On
April 17, 1867, the United States Senate ratified the Treaty, and on April 20,
1867, President Andrew Johnson accepted, ratified, and confirmed the Treaty.
Id. at 653.
54. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).  The Treaty does, however, go on to use language
similar to the 1855 Treaty when it states that the land is set aside “for the exclu-
sive use and benefit” of the Tribe. Id. at 648.
55. Id. at 648–49.
56. Id. at 650.
57. Id. at 651.
58. Id.
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government possesses the right to use timber on the reservation.59
The federal government also agreed to reserve “all springs or foun-
tains not adjacent to, or directly connected with, the streams or rivers
within the lands hereby relinquished,” promising “to keep back from
settlement or entry so much of the surrounding land as may be neces-
sary to prevent the said springs or fountains being enclosed.”60  Al-
though provisions of 1863 Treaty are similar to the 1855 Treaty, the
1863 Treaty goes much further in describing the responsibilities of the
federal government, thus establishing that the federal government
possesses significant control over certain aspects of the reservation.  It
would appear that the federal government played a stronger role on
the Nez Perce reservation following the 1863 Treaty than it did under
its treaty with the Swinomish.
On August 13, 1868, the Nez Perce and United States entered into
another treaty.61  The 1868 Treaty explicitly amended the 1863
Treaty.  For purposes of this Article, two portions of the 1868 Treaty
are relevant.  First, Article I provides for allotments to individual In-
dians living outside of the reservation.62  Second, Article II offers ad-
ditional information on how the timber resources on the reservation
are to be managed.63  It could be argued that the 1868 Treaty
amended the 1863 Treaty in a way that increased the federal role of
managing resources both on and off of the reservation.
For purposes of the discussion below regarding an enforceable
trust relationship, two overarching points can be taken from the trea-
ties between the Nez Perce and the federal government.  First, like the
treaty with the Swinomish, the treaties with the Nez Perce specifi-
cally contemplate the Tribe having access to certain resources, such as
fish—resources that are threatened by the negative impacts of climate
change.  And, second, that the treaties also make clear that the federal
government has a certain amount of management and control over the
reservation lands, especially in terms of allotment, timber, and some
water resources.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Treaties
Having identified the specific treaty language at issue, it is helpful
to now consider how a federal court might interpret such language.
Such analysis may aid tribes because of the significance of treaties.
Because the rights acknowledged in treaties were supposed to be per-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Amendatory Treaty to the Treaty of June 9, 1863, between the United States of
America and the Nez Perce Tribe of Indians, Aug. 13, 1868, 15 Stat. 693 [herein-
after 1868 Amendatory Treaty].
62. Id. at 693–94
63. Id. at 694.
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manent rights,64 treaties can be particularly powerful tools in protect-
ing natural resources.  Treaty rights are, in many cases, intimately
connected to the cultural survival of tribes.65
The meaning of treaty terms between tribes and the United States
is not always clear.  A classic example of the confusion such treaty
terms can cause is the phrase: “The right of taking fish, at all usual
and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indi-
ans, in common with all citizens of the Territory . . . [,]”66 which was
included in many Steven treaties, including the two discussed above.
For these tribes, fishing was “not much less necessary . . . than the
atmosphere they breathed.”67  The tribes therefore vigorously negoti-
ated for a term in their treaties with the United States that would
ensure their access to their traditional fishing grounds.68  However,
the precise meaning of this phrase that was added to these treaties
has been the source of vigorous debate for decades.69  Similar to the
current situation, where the negative impacts of climate change con-
strain once abundant natural resources, the meaning of these treaty
phrases became particularly important when the number and availa-
bility of fish dropped.70
A treaty between a tribe and the United States “is essentially a
contract between two sovereign nations.”71  Such treaties have also
been described as “quasi-constitutional” documents.72  However, de-
spite the similarity to both contracts and perhaps constitutional docu-
ments, the United States Supreme Court has developed special Indian
canons of construction designed to assist federal courts engaged in
treaty or statutory construction.73  In essence, “The unequal bargain-
64. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 602.  For example, U.S. Senator Sam
Houston described the perpetual nature of treaties in the following way: “As long
as water flows, or grass grows upon the earth, or the sun rises to show your path-
way, or you kindle your camp fires, so long shall you be protected by [the federal
government], and never again be removed from your present habitations.” Id.
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1854)).
65. Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1619.
66. Treaty with Nisquallys, art. III, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132.  The same or similar
language is used in each of the Stevens treaties. See supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Stevens and listing all Stevens treaties).
67. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
68. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 333 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
69. See generally Dana Johnson, Native American Treaty Rights to Scarce Natural
Resources, 43 UCLA L. REV. 547 (1995).
70. Id. at 549–50.
71. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979) (citation omitted).
72. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 408 (1993)
(explaining that tribal treaties are similar to constitutions because they are “fun-
damental, constitutive document[s]”).
73. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
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ing position of the tribes and the recognition of the trust relationship
have led to the development of canons of construction designed to rec-
tify the inequality.”74  Since the Court’s decision in Worcester v. Geor-
gia75 in 1832, it has consistently held that treaties between tribes and
the federal government should not be interpreted in a way that
prejudices tribes.76
In Worcester, the Court considered whether the State of Georgia
could apply its laws to the territory of the Cherokee Nation, then lo-
cated within the external boundaries of Georgia.77  In holding that the
laws of Georgia did not apply, the Court interpreted the Treaty of
Hopewell between the Cherokee Nation and the federal government,
and determined that the relationship between the two was like “that
of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more power-
ful.”78  Therefore, because of the tribes’ dependence on the federal gov-
ernment for protection, the Court explained that “[t]he language used
in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice.”79  In rationalizing this method of construction,80 Chief
Justice Marshall explained that it was not “reasonable to suppose,
that the Indians, who could not write and most probably could not
read, who were not critical judges of our language, should distinguish
[the legal meaning of specific words used in the treaty].”81
74. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 617.
75. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
76. PHILIP P. FRICKEY ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02
(Nell Jessup Newton ed., Lexis Nexis 2012) (1941).
77. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
78. Id. at 555.  As explained more fully below in the discussion of the federal govern-
ment’s trust relationship to tribes, this is not the first time that the Court dis-
cussed the relationship between the federal government and tribes in such terms.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court considered whether it had original juris-
diction to hear a dispute between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Georgia,
and the Court ultimately held that it did not have original jurisdiction because
the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation for purposes of original jurisdic-
tion.  30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  Although the Nation was “a distinct political soci-
ety,” the Court considered tribes “domestic dependent nations” that “are in a
state of pupilage.  Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to
his guardian.” Id. at 16–17.
79. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 582.
80. For a more in-depth discussion of the analysis applied in this case, see Note, In-
dian Canon Originalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1102–03 (2013).
81. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 552.  Chief Justice Marshall wrote in reference to an
argument made by the State of Georgia that the treaty used the term “allotted,”
which legally generally meant that the land in question had been given to the
United States.  However, Chief Justice Marshall believed that this language was
more consistent with the Tribe’s understanding of establishing a boundary be-
tween the tribe and the federal government. Id. 552–53.  Similarly, Justice Mc-
Lean, in his concurrence, explained that “[t]he language used in treaties with
Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. . . . How the words of the
treaty were understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical mean-
ing, should form the rule of construction.” Id. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring); see
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This rationale is premised on the recognition that most tribal
members, at the time, would not have spoken fluent English nor have
been familiar with the legal meaning of certain English words.82  That
tribes and the federal negotiators would have different understand-
ings of the terms used in the treaties is therefore likely reasonable.
Accordingly, the canons acknowledge that in order to give purpose to
the original meaning of the treaty, it may be necessary to view the
treaty as the tribe would have viewed it.83  Such interpretation also
helps ensure that the court’s interpretation of the treaty reflects the
will of the signatories.84  The Worcester decision also stands for the
proposition that the federal government plays the primary role in re-
lations with Indian tribes.85
Over the ensuing years, the canon favoring Indians has only been
strengthened.  In fact, the canon first developed in Worcester has be-
come a “fundamental principle of federal Indian law.”86  Throughout
the nineteenth century, the canon was applied to treaties with Indi-
ans, and, eventually, the courts began to apply the canon to statutes
applicable to Indians as well.87  For example, in Choate v. Trapp, the
Supreme Court considered whether lands that were previously owned
by Indians were tax-exempt.88  The lands in question had previously
been allocated to individual Indians on a tax-exempt basis, with the
understanding that the lands could not be alienated.89  Congress sub-
sequently removed the restriction on alienation and Oklahoma at-
tempted to tax the lands, arguing that the removal of the restriction
on alienation meant that Congress intended for the lands to now be
taxed.90  The Court rejected Oklahoma’s arguments.  First, notably,
the Court applied the rationale developed in Worcester to statutes.
Second, the Court elaborated on the method of interpretation first
used in Worcester, explaining that “doubtful expressions, instead of
being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor
also Peter S. Heinecke, Chevron and the Canon Favoring Indians, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1015, 1026 (1993) (explaining Justice McLean’s statement is “the classic for-
mulation of the canon”).
82. Indian Canon Originalism, supra note 80, at 1109.
The fact that Indian treaties were written in English, a language unfa-
miliar to the tribes, gave the United States significant leverage when
negotiating treaty terms.  If read according to its plain meaning, the re-
sulting text would often give the federal government an overwhelming
advantage in its relationship with the signatory tribe.
Id. at 1118.
83. Id. at 1113.
84. Id. at 1118.
85. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
86. Indian Canon Originalism, supra note 80, at 1103.
87. Id.
88. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 667 (1912).
89. Id. at 672.
90. Id. at 667–75.
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of a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and
dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith.”91
Ultimately, because of the federal government’s “wardship”92 over
tribes, the Court in Felix v. Patrick explained that tribes and Indians
were “entitled to a special protection in [the federal government’s]
courts.”93  Although tribes are to receive special protection for these
reasons, federal courts still give deference to Congress, as Congress
has plenary authority over tribes.94  In fact, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Indian canons “are rooted in the unique trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the Indians.”95
Today, the canons of construction of Indian law require that (1)
“treaties . . . be liberally construed in favor of the Indians,” (2) “all
ambiguities . . . be resolved in [Indians’] favor,” (3) “treaties . . . be
construed as the Indians would have understood them,” and (4) “tribal
property rights and sovereignty [be] preserved unless Congress’s in-
tent to the contract is clear and unambiguous.”96  These canons have
been applied by the courts over the ensuing decades to protect tribal
rights from infringement by other sovereigns and individuals.97  Ulti-
mately, the Court has broadly applied the canons of construction, and
only declined to apply the canons where such application would be in-
consistent with the purposes of the relationship between Congress and
the tribe(s) at issue.98
One may argue that the Indian canons of construction are no
longer applicable given that the conditions that led to their develop-
ment have changed.  However, the Supreme Court continues to justify
91. Id. at 675.
92. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–17 (1831).
93. Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317, 330 (1892).
94. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
95. Cty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).  For a discus-
sion of the federal trust relationship between tribes and the federal government,
see infra subsection III.A.1.
96. FRICKEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 113–14 (citations omitted).  At least one author,
however, has suggested that the canons may be condensed into a single rule, as
“[i]n practice, the apparent multiplicity of ‘Indian canons’ is ultimately reducible
to the single rule of construction, often emphasized by the Supreme Court, that
Indian treaties should be interpreted from the perspective of the signatory tribe.”
Indian Canon Originalism, supra note 80, at 1104.
97. Heinecke, supra note 81, at 1025–29.  The courts have generally declined to apply
the canons of construction if it is determined that there would be no benefit to the
tribe(s) involved. Id. at 1029.
98. Id. at 1029. But cf. Indian Canon Originalism, supra note 80, at 1103 (“Federal
courts continue to use the Indian canon today, although some commentators
worry that it has ‘degraded’ from a strong preference in favor of the tribe into ‘a
weak end-of-the-game tiebreaker.’  Indeed, the Supreme Court recently sug-
gested that the Indian canon is not a ‘mandatory rule[ ],’ but is instead merely a
‘guide[ ] that need not be conclusive.’” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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application of the canons for a couple of reasons.  First, the Court has
explained that continued use of the canons is justified because appli-
cation protects “the weak and defenseless [Indians] who are the wards
of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.”99  Also,
the Court has justified such continued use since the canons are protec-
tive of tribal “sovereignty and . . . independence.”100  Application of
the canons in the context envisioned by this Article is consistent with
the Court’s second justification.  Because climate change has the ca-
pacity to interfere with—if not substantially injure, in some in-
stances—the political and cultural sovereignty of tribes,101
application of the Indian canons of construction to the treaties dis-
cussed earlier has the potential to assist in the protection of tribal
“sovereignty and independence.”  One scholar has given another justi-
fication for the continued application of the canons, explaining that
“[t]he Indian canon rests on far more secure foundations than liberal
values or structural inferences—it reflects judicial fidelity to the origi-
nal meaning of the Indian treaties themselves.”102
Admittedly, courts’ interpretations of treaties have not been uni-
form nor have they followed one specific test.103  Nonetheless, treaties
still constitute the “supreme Law of the Land,”104 and they have occa-
sionally been found to provide rights of action for equitable relief
against non-contracting parties.105  Ultimately, some scholars have
concluded that “Indians fought hard, bargained extensively, and made
major concessions in return for such rights.  Treaties can, therefore,
properly be regarded as negotiated contracts of a high order.”106  It is
therefore appropriate that courts should continue to give such hard-
fought-for rights effect.
C. Considering Treaty Language Within a Climate Change
Context
As discussed above, climate change threatens the natural re-
sources and infrastructure of many tribal communities, including the
99. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973) (quoting Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  Notably,
some scholars have criticized this first justification for application of the canons
as “outmoded” given that it treats tribes as disadvantaged minorities. Indian
Canon Originalism, supra note 80, at 1105.
100. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
101. See Tsosie, supra note 8.
102. Indian Canon Originalism, supra note 80, at 1121.
103. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 608 (explaining the ad hoc federal prece-
dent on how to interpret treaties).
104. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per
curiam).
105. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 377 (1905).
106. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 603.
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Swinomish Indian Tribal Community and the Nez Perce Tribe.  Given
such a profound threat to the tribal environment, the question of
whether tribal treaties might be used by tribes to provide some legal
shelter to protect threatened resources arises.  To answer this ques-
tion, specific treaty language must be considered.  The question of
whether treaties can be used by tribes to protect resources threatened
by climate change is a highly individualistic question requiring con-
sideration of an individual tribe’s treaty.  The treaty language of trea-
ties between the United States and two Tribes was examined above,
which revealed there are some commonalities between the treaties
and some notable differences.
First, both Tribes have treaty language ensuring the Tribes’ right
to take fish at the usual and accustomed places.  Such provisions were
important for tribes of the Pacific Northwest given the high value such
communities placed on their fisheries, both for subsistential and cul-
tural reasons.  Further, federal courts have already acknowledged the
importance of such provisions in finding that the relevant tribes did
have an enforceable right to fish.107  Accordingly, based on past court
decisions, an enforceable treaty right to fish exists for these tribes.
In the context of climate change, however, the question becomes
whether the treaty language requires the federal government to take
affirmative action to protect fisheries in the region from the impacts of
climate change.  The answer to this question is not as clear.  As dis-
cussed above, treaty provisions are to be interpreted as Indians would
have understood them.  Based on the importance of fish to many tribes
both historically and contemporaneously, it seems reasonable that the
tribes negotiating for such provisions would have assumed that fisher-
ies would exist in perpetuity.  It also seems reasonable that such
tribes would have assumed that the federal government would not in-
terfere with the availability of such fish.  Accordingly, should a tribe
be able to demonstrate that the federal government’s actions or poli-
cies are interfering with the availability of its treaty-guaranteed fish-
ing rights then such a tribe might have a potential argument based on
the treaty itself.108
Next, the Nez Perce Treaties differ from the Swinomish Treaty in
that the Nez Perce Treaties provide additional detail on the manage-
ment of infrastructure and natural resources, such as timber.  Specifi-
cally, Article VIII of the 1863 Nez Perce Treaty specifies that the
107. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979).
108. Should a tribe wish to examine the possibility of a breach of federal trust respon-
sibility claim based on its treaty, it is notable that both the treaties between the
Swinomish and Nez Perce go on to detail several ways in which the federal gov-
ernment was to have control over the reservation—such as through allotment
and the establishment and management of infrastructure for a set period of time.
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infrastructure shall be “held and managed” by the federal govern-
ment.109  This language is important because it spells out an actual
role for the federal government to play in managing infrastructure on
the reservation.  Accordingly, assuming such infrastructure and fed-
eral role exist today, the Tribe may be able to enforce such a treaty
right given the specificity of the treaty language.  Similarly, the Nez
Perce Treaties provide substantial detail regarding the role that the
federal government is to play in managing the tribal timber resources.
Although these provisions do not use the term “manage” or “control,”
the Tribe could argue that the federal government is under a duty to
manage the timber resources to the benefit of the Tribe.  In the con-
text of timber resources, therefore, the Tribe may be able to argue that
the treaty requires the federal government to act in its best interest.
As a result, in addition to claims related to fish, the Nez Perce’s treaty
is sufficiently detailed enough to potentially give rise to other claims
related to certain infrastructure with the reservation, as well as the
Tribe’s timber resources.  The fact that the Indian canons require am-
biguous language to be read in favor of the tribes would support this
conclusion.
Ultimately, the answer to this question is that, yes, under certain
circumstances, tribes may be able to rely on their treaties to bring
claims against the United States requesting action to protect key tri-
bal resources mentioned in treaties.
III. POTENTIAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS BEYOND THE
TREATIES THEMSELVES
To fully understand whether this conclusion is viable, however, it
is helpful to consider other legal claims tribes may pursue pursuant to
their treaty rights.  Ultimately, it may be that treaties between the
United States and tribes, by virtue of having attributes of both inter-
national and domestic law, may be truly sui generis.110  However, de-
spite their uniqueness, consideration of potential claims based on both
domestic law and international law is helpful, as courts in both realms
have sought to interpret and apply such treaties.
This Part of the Article explores whether there are potentially en-
forceable legal arguments that tribes might make in order better pro-
tect themselves against the impacts of climate change.  Before
focusing on what may be legally enforceable arguments, however, it
should be noted that there is a moral dimension to such arguments.
For many tribes, treaties constitute “ ‘sacred text[s]’ that represent[ ]
the moral obligations of the United States to racially and culturally
distinct groups that have been treated unjustly by the dominant soci-
109. 1867 Treaty with the Nez Perce, supra note 53, at 651.
110. Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1623.
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ety.”111  Accordingly, for tribes turning to their treaty rights, there is a
moral, as well as a legal dimension, to their claims.112  In fact, “Presi-
dents from Washington to Nixon have characterized the Nation’s com-
mitments to Indians in moral terms.”113  Some scholars have
explained that “[m]orality and good faith are not notions which can be
dispensed with lightly, for they have played a major part in the devel-
opment of our jurisprudence.”114  By focusing on the legal aspects of
any potential claim, the Article does not seek to diminish the moral
importance of treaties, but rather to explore arguments that might
prove to be successful for a tribe in court or at the negotiating table.
A. Domestic Law: The Federal Trust Responsibility
As mentioned above and discussed below, there exists a federal
trust relationship between the federal government and federally rec-
ognized tribes.  Where present, the trust relationship requires the fed-
eral government to act in the best interests of tribes.  Should the
federal government breach this trust responsibility, tribes may bring
a claim against the federal government, assuming certain criteria are
met.  Accordingly, in determining whether treaties are helpful tools
for tribes searching to protect their resources from the negative im-
pacts, an examination of the federal trust relationship and its poten-
tial application in this context is necessary.
1. Historical Development of the Federal Trust Relationship
Like the canons of construction governing the interpretation of
treaty provisions, the federal trust relationship between the federal
government and tribes also has its origins in the “ward” relationship
between the federal government and tribes.115  As mentioned above,
the Court first styled the relationship between tribes and the federal
government as a wardship in Worcester v. Georgia.116  In United
States v. Kagama, the Court considered whether Congress had the au-
111. Id. at 1617.
112. Id.
113. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 659 (citations omitted).
114. Id.
115. Heinecke, supra note 1, at 1030. But cf. Wood, supra note 1, at 359 (“Those who
believe that the trust doctrine can be useful today in protecting tribal rights could
begin purging the trust responsibility of paternalistic guardian-ward language.”).
The author acknowledges that the federal trust relationship is premised on pa-
ternalistic notions, as indicated by the language used by the courts.  However,
because this Article seeks to explore the doctrine as applied by the courts, it uses
the same terminology used by the courts.  It is unlikely that advocates would
need to explore the historical origins of the federal trust relationship, and, there-
fore, modern day advocates may be well-placed to pursue purging this “wardship”
language in briefs to courts moving forward.
116. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
936 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:916
thority to enact a statute, the Major Crimes Act, which affected the
criminal jurisdiction of tribes.117  The Court ultimately determined
that Congress did have this authority, as tribes were the wards of
Congress.  The Court explained that “[t]hese Indian tribes are the
wards of the nation . . . . From their very weakness and helpless-
ness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”118
The Court found that Congress has plenary power as a result of this
wardship relationship.119  In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Court elabo-
rated on Congress’s power in Indian country, explaining that Congress
was obligated to act in good faith when exercising its plenary author-
ity.120  Interestingly and certainly relevant to the treaties at issue
here, the Court has previously explained that one element of the fed-
eral trust relationship was to encourage tribes to “abandon their no-
madic habits.”121  Accordingly, interpreting treaties to protect against
a loss of land would seem to be consistent with this past precedent, as
one of the purposes of the second phase of treaty-making was to en-
courage the permanent settlement of tribes in particular areas.
In Seminole Nation v. United States, the Court considered the re-
sponsibility of the executive branch under the trust responsibility.122
At issue in Seminole Nation were the Tribe’s efforts to recover funds
that were embezzled by tribal employees, and the Tribe argued that
the Executive Branch was aware of the embezzlement.  The Executive
Agency argued that it had fulfilled its duties by merely distributing
the money.123  The Court, however, disagreed, finding that there is a
“distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people”124
and that the Executive Branch’s dealings were to be judged by “the
most exacting fiduciary standards.”125  It would appear that “the
Court has repeatedly struck down Executive actions that infringe on
Native American rights or that do not live up to a strict fiduciary
standard.”126
117. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
118. Id. at 383–84.
119. Id. at 384.
120. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903).  Overall, “The Court has
allowed Congress tremendous latitude in its dealings with Native Americans;
nevertheless, once Congress has acted, the Court assumes Congress was acting
as a guardian.”  Heinecke, supra note 81, at 1032.
121. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 232 (1923).
122. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
123. Id. at 295.
124. Id. at 296.
125. Id. at 297; see also Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 (1919) (holding the
Executive Branch to a heightened fiduciary duty).
126. Heinecke, supra note 81, at 1032.
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2. Contemporary Federal Trust Relationship Decisions Based on
the Tucker Act
Today, when considering the federal trust relationship, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between claims brought on the basis of the Tucker
Acts (Indian Tucker Act and Tucker Act) and claims brought on the
basis of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  Both of the Tucker
Acts require that a claim be based on an express law.127  Conversely,
the APA is typically used to challenge final agency actions alleged to
be arbitrary and capricious.128  In the context of the federal trust rela-
tionship, a tribe would likely utilize the Tucker Acts when seeking
monetary damages and the APA when requesting injunctive relief.129
Accordingly, given the differing requirements and remedies provided
by these Acts, it is important to examine cases based on these statutes
separately.  This Article considers both, starting with claims brought
on the basis of the Tucker Acts.
Before examining the this first category of cases—claims based on
the Tucker Acts—it should first be acknowledged that a claim based
on an enforceable duty under the federal trust relationship must be
brought within the applicable statute of limitations.130  In determin-
ing when the claim accrues, a court considers when the tribe “was or
should have been aware” of the material facts underlying the claim.131
There are generally thought to be three categories of claims based
on a breach of the federal trust responsibility that can be brought by
Indian tribes against the federal government.  These three categories
include: (1) general trust claims; (2) bare/limited trust claims; and (3)
127. The Indian Tucker Act provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any
claim against the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor
of any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians resid-
ing within the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever
such claim is one arising under the Constitution, law or treaties of the
United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which oth-
erwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claim-
ant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2013).  Similarly, the Tucker Act provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to
render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded ei-
ther upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2013).
128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2013).
129. Wood, supra note 1, at 363–68.
130. Blackfeet Housing v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 142, 145–46 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
131. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted).
938 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:916
full trust claims.132  Some of the Supreme Court’s early Indian law
decisions, such as Cherokee Nation, Worcester, Kagama and Lone
Wolf, may form a claim under the first category of trust responsibility
cases, a general trust claim.133  As discussed above,134 these early Su-
preme Court cases reflect the basic understanding at the time that the
federal government owed a duty of protection to tribes.135  In Semi-
nole Nation v. United States, the Court described the moral dimen-
sions of the federal government’s relationship with tribes, explaining
that it is “a humane and self imposed policy . . . [under which the
federal government] has charged itself with moral obligations of the
highest responsibility and trust,” and which should be “judged by the
most exacting fiduciary standards.”136  In fact, “The [Supreme] Court
has consistently characterized the relationship between Congress and
the American Indian as ‘solemn,’ ‘unique,’ or ‘special,’ and ‘moral.’ ”137
However, the Court typically rejects such claims if the alleged
moral obligation is the sole basis of the claim.138  Courts have denied
such claims because, as a sovereign nation itself, the United States
must explicitly accept obligations in order to be legally responsible for
such obligations.139  Accordingly, federal courts generally reject argu-
ments based solely on these early cases because they find that the
United States has not accepted any sort of obligation over the trust
corpus at issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has also recognized a second
category—a claim for breach of a bare or limited trust responsibility.
Notably, both Mitchell I140 and Mitchell II,141 involved claims for
132. JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 300 (1st ed. 2002).
133. A “general trust claim” refers to a claim based on the relationship formed be-
tween tribal nations and the federal government in part due to the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Cherokee Nation, Worcester, Kagama and Lone Wolf.  Taken
together, these cases stand for the idea that the federal government has re-
stricted tribal expressions of external sovereignty.  Because the federal govern-
ment has limited the ability of tribal nations to exercise their external
sovereignty, the federal government therefore owes a duty of protection to tribal
nations and a duty to act in the best interests of tribal nations.  Because this duty
is not premised on any specific congressional statement or enactment and be-
cause such a duty has never been found to be legally enforceable against the
United States, it is said to be a general duty or a moral obligation.
134. See supra subsection III.A.1.
135. Heinecke, supra note 81, at 1030.
136. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
137. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 658 (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., Blackfeet Housing v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 142, 148 (2012) (re-
jecting the Blackfeet Housing Authority’s argument that the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development had a “general trust relationship”).
139. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011).
140. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
141. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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monetary relief based on the Tuckers Acts, and, therefore, these cases
should be distinguished from claims requesting injunctive relief under
the APA, as discussed below.142  In 1980, the Supreme Court decided
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I).143  In Mitchell I, the Court eval-
uated Section 5 of the General Allotment Act144 to determine whether
the Secretary of the Interior was liable for an alleged breach of trust
related to the management of timber resources and related funds.145
Although the General Allotment Act included language that land was
to be held “in trust,” the Court concluded that, because the federal
government had not agreed to manage the land, only a bare trust ex-
isted.146  In other words, because the Act did not place any affirmative
management duties on the federal government, the Supreme Court
held in favor of the Secretary.  The Court remanded Mitchell I to the
Court of Claims for a determination of whether government liability
might have existed under other statutes.147
In 1983, the Supreme Court considered the matter again in Mitch-
ell II.148 Mitchell II differed from Mitchell I, because in Mitchell II the
tribes relied on a variety of statutes related to the management of tim-
ber resources, which is an area where the federal government has ex-
ercised pretty sizeable control.149  The Supreme Court agreed with the
Indian tribe that the federal government had undertaken substantial
control over the trust corpus at issue, finding that the statutes in
question “clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to
manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians.”150
Once the Court determined that the government had agreed to as-
sume control over the trust corpus at issue, it then looked to the com-
mon law of private trusts to assess the government’s liability.151  The
Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell II is an example of the third cat-
egory of trust cases—a legally enforceable claim.
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court continued to develop its jurispru-
dence on the question of the federal trust relationship based on the
Tucker Acts by releasing two decisions.  Both claims requested mone-
tary damages, and, again, can be distinguished from claims request-
ing injunctive relief, as discussed below.152  The first of these
142. See infra subsection III.A.3.
143. 445 U.S. 535.
144. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006).
145. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 534.
146. Id. at 544.
147. Id. at 546.
148. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
149. Id. at 209.
150. Id. at 224.
151. Id. at 226.
152. See infra subsection III.A.3.
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decisions came in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States.153
The claim at issue in White Mountain Apache was whether the federal
government had failed to adequately manage Fort Apache, which was
held in trust for the Tribe, and, if as a result of this mismanagement
the Indian tribe was entitled to compensation for the upkeep of Fort
Apache.154  The statute at issue directed the federal government to
hold Fort Apache in trust for the Tribe and, importantly, gave the fed-
eral government “authority to make direct use of portions of the trust
corpus.”155  Therefore, because the federal government had the au-
thority to control and manage the trust corpus at issue—Fort
Apache—the Court determined that an enforceable trust relationship
existed between the federal government and the Tribe, thereby award-
ing damages to the Tribe.156
The Supreme Court decided a second case related to the federal
trust relationship on the same day in 2003—United States v. Navajo
Nation.157  Here, the Navajo Nation alleged that the Secretary of the
Interior acted inappropriately in his role during the negotiation of
mineral leases on the Navajo Nation.158  The Nation argued that the
Secretary violated his fiduciary duty to act in the Nation’s best inter-
est under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 and other related regula-
tions.159  The case was first heard by the Court of Federal Claims in
2000 on cross-motions for summary judgment.160  The Supreme Court
did not find in favor of the Navajo Nation.  Although the Court ac-
knowledged the unprofessional behavior of the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, the Court determined that the Nation had failed to establish that
the Secretary was under a binding obligation to manage the trust
corpus at issue.161  The Court explained that the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938 gave the Nation the right to negotiate leases and, as a result,
the Secretary of the Interior did not have full authority over manage-
ment of the resources in question.162
On remand to determine whether other statutes created an en-
forceable duty, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that federal common law and other statutes did create an enforceable
trust responsibility in the case against the federal government.163
153. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
154. Id. at 468.
155. Id. at 475.
156. Id. at 475–76.
157. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
158. Id. at 500.
159. Id.
160. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. 217 (2000), rev’d, 263 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d,
537 U.S. 488.
161. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 507–08.
162. Id. at 507.
163. Navajo Nation, 501 F.3d 1327, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556 U.S. 287
(2009).
2016] TRIBAL TREATIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 941
The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “[b]ecause the Tribe
cannot identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or regula-
tion that the Government violated, we do not reach the question
whether the trust duty was money mandating.”164
Based on the Court’s analysis in White Mountain Apache and Nav-
ajo Nation, in determining whether there is an enforceable trust rela-
tionship that falls into the third category discussed above, the Court
focuses its analysis on the amount of control by the federal govern-
ment over the trust corpus in question.  Where the federal government
had near complete control over the trust corpus, as in White Mountain
Apache, the Court found in the Tribe’s favor.  Therefore, scholars have
concluded that “[a]fter these cases, finding a ‘network’ of statutes to
base a breach of trust damages claim depends on: (1) express statutory
language supporting a fiduciary relationship; and (2) comprehensive
control over government property.”165
On June 13, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the question
the scope of the federal government’s trust relationship in United
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation.166 Jicarilla Apache Nation differs
procedurally from the previous federal trust relationship decisions in
that the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court came as a writ of manda-
mus by the United States to vacate an Order requiring the United
States to release certain documents in a breach of trust claim brought
against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims.  In
this regard, the decision differs from those discussed above because it
is not necessarily a claim for monetary relief under one of the Tucker
Acts.  However, the Court applied its precedent from those cases, and,
therefore, it is helpful to consider the Court’s development of the fed-
eral trust relationship jurisprudence in this case.
At issue in the underlying litigation is the federal “[g]overnment’s
management of the [Nation’s] trust accounts from 1972 to 1992.”167
Asserting the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product doc-
trine, the federal government declined to turn over 155 documents re-
quested by the Nation.168  “The Tribe argues, however, that the
common law also recognizes a fiduciary exception to the attorney-cli-
164. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 302.
165. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR. & MATTHEW
L.M. FLETCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 342 (6th ed.
2011).
166. 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).  Because the underlying case in this matter involves In-
dian trust fund management, the Court’s decision might properly be limited to
such types of cases, which are not the focus of review in this Article.  However,
given that Jicarilla Apache Nation represents the Court’s most recent discussion
of the federal trust relationship, a review of the Court’s analysis is still helpful in
understanding the contours of that relationship.
167. Id. at 2319.
168. Id.
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ent privilege and that, by virtue of the trust relationship between the
Government and the Tribe, documents that would otherwise be privi-
leged must be disclosed.”169
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the com-
mon law fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to
the United States when it acted as trustee for tribal trust assets.170
The Court held that the exception did not apply, as the federal govern-
ment acts as a private trustee in very limited circumstances.171  Nota-
bly, the Court described the case as involving a claim to a “general
trust relationship,”172 which, as discussed above, the Court has never
found to be enforceable against the federal government.  Furthermore,
the Court explained that “[t]he Government, of course, is not a private
trustee.  Though the relevant statutes denominate the relationship be-
tween the Government and the Indians a ‘trust,’ see, e.g., 25 U.S.C.
§ 162a, that trust is defined and governed by statutes rather than the
common law.”173  In fact, Congress may use the term “trust” in
describing its relationship with tribes, but this does not mean that an
enforceable trust relationship exists.174  Rather, in order to be legally
liable, the government must consent to be liable.175  This is because
the trust relationship is a sovereign function of Congress,176 as the
trust relationship was designed to benefit both the tribes and the fed-
eral government.177  The Court reasoned that the federal government
does not act as a private trustee when it is fulfilling its statutory du-
ties.178  Ultimately, the Court explicated that while common law prin-
ciples may “inform our interpretation of statutes and to determine the
scope of liability that Congress has imposed . . . the applicable statutes
and regulations ‘establish [the] fiduciary relationship and define the
contours of the United States’ fiduciary responsibilities.’”179
Despite the Court’s determination that the federal trust relation-
ship did not exist in the matter at bar, however, the Court’s majority
opinion did acknowledge the continued existence of the federal trust
relationship, explaining, “We do not question ‘the undisputed exis-
169. Id. at 2321.
170. Id. at 2321–22.
171. Id. at 2326.
172. Id. at 2318.




177. Id. at 2327.
178. Id. at 2318.
179. Id. at 2325 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983)).  The Court went on to
explain that “[t]he Government assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the
extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute.” Id.  But cf. Wood,
supra note 1, at 361 (explaining that the federal government owes tribes a com-
mon law duty of protection).
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tence of a general trust relationship between the United States and
the Indian people.’ . . . Congress has expressed this policy in a series of
statutes that have defined and redefined the trust relationship be-
tween the United States and the Indian tribes.”180  Justice Sotomayor,
in her dissent, went on to explain:
Since 1831, this Court has recognized the existence of a general trust relation-
ship between the United States and Indian tribes. . . . Our decisions over the
past century have repeatedly reaffirmed this “distinctive obligation of trust
incumbent upon the Government” in its dealings with Indians. . . . Congress,
too, has recognized the general trust relationship between the United States
and Indian tribes.  Indeed, “[n]early every piece of modern legislation dealing
with Indian tribes contains a statement reaffirming the trust relationship be-
tween tribes and the federal government.”181
Following the Court’s decision in Jicarilla Apache Nation, the
lower federal courts have required that a tribe asserting the federal
trust responsibility as the basis of its claim against the federal govern-
ment must first assert a substantive source of law that requires the
federal government to act as a fiduciary or undertake certain obliga-
tions.182  Absent such an explicit requirement neither the govern-
ment’s control nor common law obligations matter in terms of
recognizing an enforceable trust relationship against the United
States.183  “Only once a statutory duty has been identified can com-
mon law trust principles potentially have relevance in defining the
scope of that duty . . . .”184  Some courts, however, have determined
that they may “refer to traditional trust principles when those princi-
ples are consistent with the statute and help illuminate its mean-
ing.”185  But, yet, tribes cannot resort to the common law in order to
override the express language of the treaty or statute at issue.186
Furthermore, the federal courts have explained that mere federal
oversight does not amount to the necessary day-to-day control over
operations typically required for a successful claim based on the fed-
eral trust relationship.187  Some courts have spoken of applying the
Indian canons of construction to resolve any ambiguities in determin-
ing whether or not a trust relationship exists.188  Also, in determining
whether a particular law provides a cause of action, it is not necessary
that the law explicitly provide a private right of action.189  In fact, “All
180. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 2324 (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 2334 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
182. See, e.g., Blackfeet Housing v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 142, 149 (2012).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 150.
185. Fletcher v. United States, 730 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2013).
186. Id. at 1208.
187. See, e.g., Blackfeet Housing, 106 Fed. Cl. at 151.
188. Fletcher, 730 F.3d at 1210–11.
189. Id. at 1211.
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that’s required for a private right of action to exist is a showing the
statute at hand ‘can fairly be interpreted’ to permit it.”190
A recent federal trust responsibility case that may be similar to
claims brought by tribes on the basis of their treaties is Hopi Tribe v.
United States.191  Here, the Hopi Tribe brought suit to recover mone-
tary damages for breach of trust, similar to the cases discussed above,
alleging that the federal government failed to provide water for the
Tribe’s reservation that was free from arsenic contamination.192  The
Tribe based its complaint on the Executive Order creating its reserva-
tion and a subsequent Act of Congress that incorporated the require-
ments of that Executive Order by reference.193  Although treaties and
executive orders are different legal instruments, both were used by
the federal government to create Indian reservations.  “According to
plaintiff, by establishing the Reservation and holding the land in
trust, the Executive Order of 1882 and the Act of 1958 created a duty
on the part of defendant to protect the trust property, including the
Reservation’s water supply.”194  In response, the United States argued
that the Tribe failed to identify a legally enforceable source of law re-
quiring the United States to provide a certain quality of water for the
reservation.195  Although the federal government acknowledged that
it held the water in trust for the Tribe, the government argued that
the general trust relationship did not create an enforceable duty to
provide a certain level of water quality.196  The Tribe responded by
asserting that the federal government played a sufficient role in the
management of the Tribe’s water resources.197
In considering the Tribe’s claim, the Court of Federal Claims (CFC)
focused on “whether plaintiff has met the jurisdictional test for identi-
fying a money-mandating trust duty.”198  Before reaching the legal
question at hand, the CFC first determined that the federal govern-
ment waived its immunity from suit under the Indian Tucker Act.199
The CFC then went on to consider the precise trust duty at issue, rec-
ognizing that the Supreme Court has “consistently defined trust du-
ties by closely examining the statutes that impose them.”200  The CFC
therefore considered the language in the Executive Order and related
statute to look for trust language and the specific authority of the fed-
190. Id. (citation omitted).
191. 113 Fed. Cl. 43 (2013), aff’d, 782 F.3d 662 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
192. Id. at 44.




197. Id. at 45–46.
198. Id. at 47.
199. Id.
200. Id. (citations omitted).
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eral government.201  The court explained that, in order to have an en-
forceable trust relationship, the Tribe must first identify a substantive
source of law and then show that the law mandates damages.202  Ulti-
mately, the CFC determined that the Executive Order and related act
do not speak to a duty to protect the reservation’s water.203  The CFC
rejected the Tribe’s argument that liability existed because of the high
degree of control the federal government exercised over the water, ex-
plaining that “[t]he Federal Government’s liability cannot be premised
on control alone.”204  Further, the CFC determined that the federal
government must explicitly accept the duty in order to be liable, which
the federal government had not done in the case of providing a certain
level of water quality for the Tribe’s reservation.205  Therefore, the
CFC concluded that the Executive Order and statute cited by the
Tribe did not impose a duty on the federal government that amounted
to a compensable breach of the federal trust relationship.206
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the CFC’s
determination, finding that neither the Executive Order nor the re-
lated Act created an enforceable substantive right.207  In its opinion,
the Federal Circuit started by detailing the language of the Executive
Order at issue—that the land be “withdrawn from settlement and
sale, and set apart for the use and occupancy of the [Hopi] and other
such Indians as the Secretary of the Interior may see fit to settle
thereon.”208  This language is helpful to the court’s analysis, as the
language does not specifically contemplate creating an enforceable
trust relationship with and against the federal government.  The court
went on to acknowledge that the Tribe owned four of the public water
systems at issue, while the federal government owned and operated
one system.209
Before discussing its legal conclusions, the court explained that the
Tribe needed to demonstrate that the federal government had waived
its sovereign immunity.  While the Indian Tucker Act can amount to a
waiver of sovereign immunity, it does not create any substantive
rights.210  Accordingly, the Tribe must identify a substantive source of
law in order to establish the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  The
court therefore explained that a two-step test existed to establish ju-
201. Id. at 48.
202. Id. at 48–49.
203. Id. at 49.
204. Id. (quoting Navajo Nation II, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (2009)).
205. Id. at 50.
206. Id.
207. Hopi Tribe v. United States, 782 F.3d 662, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
208. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing INDIAN AFFAIRS:  LAWS AND TREA-
TIES 805 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904)).
209. Id. at 666.
210. Id.
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risdiction on the basis of the Indian Tucker Act: “First, the claimant
‘must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fi-
duciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed to
faithfully perform those duties.’”211  Only after this first step is ac-
complished will the court go on to consider whether the substantive
source of law mandates money damages.212
In this case, the court never went to the second step of the test, as
it determined that the Tribe failed to identify a substantive source of
law that created specific fiduciary duties.  The court explained that
“[t]o establish that the United States has accepted a particular fiduci-
ary duty, an Indian tribe must identify statutes or regulations that
both impose a specific obligation on the United States and ‘bear[ ] the
hallmarks of a conventional fiduciary relationship.’”213  The court
therefore examined the statutes and Executive Order relied on by the
Tribe to determine whether they established “comprehensive respon-
sibilities” with which the federal government was required to comply.
In concluding that “these provisions [asserted by the Tribe] do not es-
tablish a fiduciary duty to ensure adequate drinking water,”214 the
court explained that neither the Executive Order nor the statute re-
ferred to managing drinking water on the reservation.215  The Tribe
argued that the language at issue should be read in light of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Winters v. United States.216  While the court
recognized that the Winters Doctrine may give the federal government
the ability to enjoin others from restricting the flow of water into the
reservation, the doctrine does not create an affirmative duty on the
part of the federal government to ensure water quality.217  Further-
more, while the Tribe pointed to several other statutes that allegedly
demonstrated the federal government has substantial control over
water resources on the reservation, the court explained that a court
cannot infer that the federal government accepted an affirmative fidu-
ciary duty merely because it exercises substantial control in a certain
area.218  Accordingly, at best, the Tribe only demonstrated the exis-
tence of a bare trust, and thus there was no substantive law creating a
fiduciary obligation.  Therefore, the court never reached the second
211. Id. at 667 (quoting Navajo II, 556 U.S. at 290 (2009)).
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting Navajo II, 556 U.S. at 301) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Id. at 668.
215. Id. at 669.
216. Id.  In Winters, the Court held that Congress must have intended to reserve
water rights for the Indian reservation, even though Congress did not explicitly
mention such rights in setting aside land for the reservation.  Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
217. Hopi Tribe, 782 F.3d at 669 (“[T]he Act still does not impose a fiduciary duty to
manage water quality on the Hopi Reservation, absent third-party
interference.”).
218. Id. at 671.
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question of whether there is a money-mandating provision of the fidu-
ciary obligation.219
3. Contemporary Federal Trust Relationship Decisions Based on
the APA
Bringing a money-mandating claim based on one of the Tucker
Acts is not the only type of claim available to tribes considering a
breach of fiduciary trust claim, however.  Tribes may also consider a
claim based on the APA.  At least one scholar has argued that the fed-
eral trust relationship should be examined from a property perspec-
tive, as “[i]t is a principle that arises from the native relinquishment
of land in reliance on federal assurances that retained lands and re-
sources would be protected for future generations.  It bears rough
analogy to nuisance and trespass law.”220  By putting the trust rela-
tionship within the context of statutes as required by the Tucker Act
line of cases discussed above, courts are left to interpret the will of
Congress rather than what might be best for tribes.221  Alternatively,
the APA does not require an explicit law in order for enforcement to
occur, and therefore, in general, trust enforcement based on the APA
tends to be broader than enforcement based on the Tucker Acts.222
Accordingly, by moving away from statutory interpretation, courts are
given more leeway to “formulate legal principles to carry out the in-
tent of the treaties or other agreements.”223
Another recent federal trust responsibility case that may prove
helpful in understanding the likely success of claims based on the APA
and treaties is Lebeau v. United States.224 Lebeau relates back to the
construction of the Oahe Dam in the 1940s, which resulted in the
flooding of substantial land holdings of the Cheyenne River Sioux
219. Id.
220. Wood, supra note 1, at 358.  Professor Wood goes on to explain that “[o]wnership
of land carries corollary rights of government protection—the right to seek judi-
cial redress against harm to property.  The Indian trust responsibility is protec-
tion for property guaranteed on the sovereign level, from the federal government
to tribes.” Id.  Professor Wood suggests that this relationship is not based on a
wardship, but rather is a sovereign trust model. Id. at 359.
221. Id. at 362.  Professor Wood further explains:
When judges equate trust standards with statutory standards, they
eliminate the role of the trust responsibility in protecting uniquely tribal
interests, and Indian law itself moves towards assimilation because the
one potentially powerful tool for protecting unique native interests be-
comes interpreted as merely a majority standard.  And more broadly,
when courts define common law duties according to statutory standards,
they diminish their own role in protecting native rights, and the balance
of power shifts toward Congress.
Id. at 363.
222. Id. at 365.
223. Id. at 361.
224. No. CIV. 14-4056, 2015 WL 846714 (D. S.D. Feb. 26, 2015).
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Tribe and its individual members.225  In 1954, Congress authorized
payments to the Tribe and its affected members, and, in 2000, Con-
gress again offered payment under the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
Equitable Compensation Act (CRSTECA) after it acknowledged that
the payment made in 1954 was inadequate for the value of the land
flooded.226  The plaintiffs in Lebeau made several arguments, but, of
relevance to this Article, they argued that the United States took the
land in question in violation of its trust and fiduciary duties.  The
United States defended against this argument by asserting that there
was no waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity.227
The plaintiffs argued that sovereign immunity was waived under the
APA.228
The court began by explaining that, while sovereign immunity is
usually an affirmative defense, it becomes a jurisdictional issue in
lawsuits against the federal government.229  The APA has a six-year
statute of limitations.230  The federal government’s waiver of sover-
eign immunity, therefore, only lasted for six years from the time the
claim accrued.231  On the plaintiff’s claim that the federal government
failed to meet its trust obligation to limit the alienation of the land at
issue, they used the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, along with the Gen-
eral Allotment Act and the Act of March 2, 1889, to assert the exis-
tence of such a trust obligation.232  A treaty was therefore central to
the plaintiff’s claims of an enforceable trust obligation.  However, the
court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that, even if an enforceable
trust relationship existed on the basis of these sources of law, the
claim accrued when the land in question was taken via the flood-
ing.233  Accordingly, the six-year statute of limitations had long since
expired.234  The plaintiffs did make two arguments asserting the ex-
tension of the statute of limitations—repudiation and the existence of
continuing violations.235  The court rejected both arguments, however,
finding that the repudiation doctrine did not apply because the federal
government did not hold any funds in trust for the plaintiffs and that
225. Id. at *1.
226. Id.




231. Id. at *3 (“[A] plaintiff’s claim ‘accrues’ for purposes of § 2401(a) when the plain-
tiff ‘either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,
that [he or she] had a claim.’” (quoting Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kim-
bell, 558 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2009))).
232. Id. at *4.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at *5–*7.
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the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of continuing
violations.236
The court’s analysis is helpful here because it demonstrates reluc-
tance on the part of federal courts to extend the applicable statute of
limitations, even in situations such as this case where the court is
sympathetic to the claims being brought.237  Moreover, the court’s de-
cision is a reminder that ignorance of potential legal claims is not a
defense against the running of a statute of limitations.238  Accord-
ingly, the case raises the important question of when the statute of
limitations began or begins to run on claims related to the negative
impacts of climate change.
A more recent case that demonstrates how some courts have con-
flated claims based on the Tucker Acts and APA is El Paso Natural
Gas Co. v. United States.239  In El Paso Natural Gas, the El Paso Nat-
ural Gas Company brought a complaint against the United States ar-
guing the federal government failed to meet its obligations under
certain federal statutes.240  The Navajo Nation intervened in the case
because one of the dumps at issue was located in Tuba City, which is
inside the Navajo Nation reservation.241  The Nation alleged viola-
tions of various federal environmental statutes including: the APA,
the Indian Agricultural Resources Management Act, the Indian Lands
Open Dump Cleanup Act, and also specific Navajo law, including
treaty provisions and the related federal trust responsibility.242  The
United States moved for partial dismissal and the court ultimately
granted the motion after it determined the Nation failed to identify a
specific trust duty in relevant part.243
In reaching its decision to grant the federal government’s motion
for partial dismissal, the court reviewed the Nation’s claims.  In rele-
vant part, the Nation made arguments based on its 1850 treaty with
the United States.244  This treaty granted the federal government the
exclusive right to regulate trade with the Nation, and the federal gov-
ernment promised to “so legislate and act as to secure permanent
prosperity and happiness of said [Navajo] Indians.”245  The Nation ar-
gued that the federal government failed to fulfill its trust responsibili-
236. Id.
237. Id. at *9.
238. Id. at *4 (“Additionally, ignorance of legal rights is insufficient to toll the statute
of limitations.” (citing DuMarce v. Scarlett, 446 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006))).
239. 774 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2011).
240. Id. at 43.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 42–43.
243. Id. at 42–44.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ties based on both the treaty and federal common law.246  The Nation,
therefore, specifically linked its treaty rights to the federal trust re-
sponsibility.  Further, the Nation claimed that the federal govern-
ment’s sovereign immunity was waived on the basis of the APA.
The court rejected the Nation’s claim.  First, the court explained
that the APA could not be used as a basis for a waiver of the federal
government’s immunity in this case because the Nation failed to iden-
tify a final agency action.247  However, despite the fact that the Na-
tion argued for a waiver on the basis of the APA, the court applied
Tucker Act cases—such as Navajo Nation and White Mountain
Apache—to determine whether there was a breach of the federal trust
relationship.248  Accordingly, by applying the Tucker Act line of cases,
the court determined that the Nation had to identify a specific fiduci-
ary duty.249  Ultimately, the court concluded, “[W]hile the 1850 Treaty
and other federal statutes clearly create a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the Tribe and defendant, they do not create an independent
cause of action.”250  The court went on to explain that under the
treaty, nothing specified that the land in question was under the con-
trol of the federal government.251  Moreover, the court explained that
a common law trust obligation did not apply.252  Instead, the court
held that the treaty in question, at best, established a limited trust
responsibility and not an enforceable duty.253
Accordingly, this case identifies two helpful trends for tribes inter-
ested in bringing an APA claim based on breach of federal trust rela-
tionship claim and in relation to climate change.  First, a tribe
considering such a claim must clearly identify the final agency action
that allows it to sue under the APA, requiring the waiver of federal
sovereign immunity.  Second, tribes wishing to utilize the APA are
limited to a six-year statute of limitations and therefore should act as
soon as the impacts of climate change are identifiable within the
tribe’s territory.
4. Application of the Federal Trust Relationship Within the
Climate Change Context
Having now examined the historical development of the federal
trust relationship, in addition to the two lines of cases—Tucker Act-
and APA-based cases—we can now turn to a discussion of how the
246. Id. at 51.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 51–53.
249. Id. at 51.
250. Id. at 52.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 52–53.
253. Id.
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federal trust responsibility might be used in conjunction with tribal
treaty provisions to provide legal protection against the negative im-
pacts of climate change.  Following her review of tribal trust claims
based on the APA, Professor Woods concludes that “[t]he successful
cases for tribes are those in which the judge clearly identifies the dis-
cretion in the statute, understands the Indian interest, and recognizes
that the Indian interest demands protection greater than that nor-
mally provided by the agency.”254  Importantly, beginning in 1980,
federal courts began to conflate APA claims for injunctive relief with
claims for money damages under the Tucker Acts.255  Accordingly, ad-
vocates utilizing an APA-based claim would be wise to ensure to the
greatest extent possible that the court understands the difference be-
tween the two.  When the different criteria between the two types of
claims are made clear to the court, tribal advocates increase their like-
lihood of success.256  If tribes can therefore identify a final federal ac-
tion related to the impacts of climate change that occurred within six
years of the time they desire to bring a claim for a breach of the fed-
eral trust relationship, then such tribes might be successful under the
more lenient APA-based federal trust relationship precedent.  Because
the potential final agency action that might trigger such a claim is
unknown, this Article cannot speculate as to whether the treaty provi-
sions of the Swinomish and Nez Perce Tribes discussed above257
would meet the criteria for a successful breach of trust claim with the
APA serving to waive federal sovereign immunity.
However, the same is not true for money-mandating claims at-
tempting to use the Tucker Acts for a waiver of federal sovereign im-
munity.  Admittedly, the requirement under the courts’ interpretation
of the Tucker Acts that a tribe identify a specific statutory duty before
a trust claim is actionable for monetary damages can be a significant
barrier to tribes seeking to enforce the trust relationship in relation to
climate change.258  Even under the more strict analysis applied for
claims based on the Tucker Acts, however, tribes may be able to pre-
vail.  To do so, the federal courts generally require that the tribe es-
tablish a specific law mandating federal action, and once such a law
has been identified the tribe must also demonstrate that the federal
government has significant control over the resources at issue.259
254. Wood, supra note 1, at 362.
255. Id. at 365.
256. Id. at 368.  Professor Wood goes on to explain that “[t]ribal lawyers should clarify
that claims brought under the APA may rely on a common law trust duty inter-
jected as an interstitial obligation within a statutory scheme lacking explicit
trust language.” Id.
257. See supra section II.A.
258. Wood, supra note 1, at 367.
259. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache v. United States, 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
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To start the analysis, the language of the Swinomish and Nez
Perce treaties should be examined to determine whether there is any
specific language creating a trust.  As previously explained, both sets
of treaties have language indicating the tribes have the right to take
fish at the usual and accustomed places.  This language is certainly
specific and, at the very least, implicitly suggests the federal govern-
ment undertook an obligation to ensure the tribes had access to fisher-
ies.  So, it is possible the treaties establish the specific language
required by the precedent discussed above.
However, the Tribes may have difficulty demonstrating that the
federal government has extensive control over the fish guaranteed to
the Tribes.  In general (and certainly relevant to the climate change
context), a tribe may be able to argue that the federal government ex-
ercises substantial control over the tribal environment.  For example,
over the past several decades, the federal government has exercised
substantial control over the environment through a network of federal
environmental statutes,260 such as the Clean Water Act261 and Clean
Air Act.262  Most of the federal environmental laws apply, at least in
some part, to tribes.263  Moreover, “Court decisions make clear that
the entire federal government is blanketed by the trust responsibility,
and that every federal agency, not just the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
must fulfill the trust responsibility in implementing statutes.”264  In
fact, at least one scholar has written comprehensively about how the
EPA might meet its federal trust responsibility to tribes through en-
forcement of the Clean Water Act.265  Accordingly, while federal con-
trol is not enough in and of itself to amount to an enforceable trust
relationship,266 the combination of this extensive federal control over
the tribal environment coupled with the language contained in the
treaties may be enough to enable a claim of an enforceable trust
relationship.
260. Wood, supra note 1, at 360 (“Unlike historical times, there is now a detailed stat-
utory environmental scheme to control actions that harm the environment—a
scheme that includes the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental Policy Act,
and more.” (citations omitted)).
261. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251–1388 (2012)).
262. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401–7431 (2012)).
263. See Environmental Protection in Indian Country Portal, Tribal Assumption of
Federal Laws, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribal-assumption-federal-laws-
treatment-state-tas (last updated Oct. 28, 2015), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/LUR2-6X82.
264. Wood, supra note 1, at 360 (citations omitted).
265. See generally Catherine A. O’Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards,
Contaminated Fish, and “Acceptable” Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
3 (2000).
266. See supra notes 34–35, 245 and accompanying text.
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Such a general argument in relation to fish is unlikely to be per-
suasive.  Rather, it would seem more likely that a court would treat
such an argument from either of the Tribes in a manner similar to the
court’s decision in Hopi Tribe v. United States,267 as discussed above.
There the Tribe argued that the federal government breached its fed-
eral trust responsibility to the Tribe by failing to provide a certain
standard of water quality.  In relevant part, the court recognized that
the Winters Doctrine may guarantee access to water for the Tribe and
even give the federal government authority to enjoin others from tak-
ing the water, but that such a doctrine did not require the federal gov-
ernment to provide a certain standard of water.268  So too here, the
treaty provisions guaranteeing the Tribes a right to take fish may al-
low the federal government to intervene to ensure that others do not
interfere with the Tribes’ right to fish.  However, there is nothing in
the Treaties requiring that the federal government maintain a certain
quality or quantity of fish.  Accordingly, a breach of federal trust rela-
tionship claim based on the treaty language specific to the right to fish
for the Swinomish and Nez Perce Tribes is unlikely to result in a
money-mandating decision from a federal court.
Interestingly, however, the Nez Perce may have a stronger claim
related to their infrastructure and timber resources.  Article III of the
1863 Treaty between the Nez Perce and the United States provides
extensive guidance on how the land shall be allotted and distributed
to individual members of the Tribe.269  Further, Article V of the 1863
Treaty states that the federal government shall provide significant in-
frastructure development, including construction of a school, hospital,
blacksmith’s shop, houses, and shall supply certain professionals to
assist on the reservation for a set period of time.270  Article VIII says
that the federal government shall have the right to develop roads, ho-
tels, and stage stands as necessary for the public good.271  Article VIII
also says that the ferries and bridges on the reservation “shall be held
and managed for the benefit” of the Tribe, and that the “rents, profits,
and issues” resulting from federal regulation on the reservation “shall
inure to the benefit” of the Tribe.272  Under Article VIII, the federal
government possesses the right to use timber on the reservation.273
The federal government also agreed to reserve “all springs or foun-
tains not adjacent to, or directly connected with, the streams or rivers
267. 782 F.3d 662 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
268. Id. at 669.
269. 1867 Treaty with the Nez Perce, supra note 53, at art. III.  On April 17, 1867, the
United States Senate ratified the Treaty, and on April 20, 1867, President An-
drew Johnson accepted, ratified, and confirmed the treaty. Id.
270. Id. at art. V.
271. Id. at art. VIII.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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within the lands hereby relinquished,” promising to “keep back from
settlement or entry so much of the surrounding land as may be neces-
sary to prevent the said springs or fountains being enclosed.”274
Moreover, on August 13, 1868, the Nez Perce and United States en-
tered into another treaty.275  The 1868 Treaty amended the 1863
Treaty, and Article I of the 1868 Treaty provides for allotments to in-
dividual Indians living outside of the reservation.276  Second, Article
II details how the timber resources on the reservation are to be
managed.277
The language of the 1863 and 1868 Treaties is important to deter-
mining whether the Tribe may have an enforceable breach of trust
claim based on the Tucker Acts.  The first requirement for a successful
claim could arguably be met, as the language of these two Treaties is
very specific as to certain items such as infrastructure, springs, and
timber.  The question then becomes whether the second prong of the
test could be met—whether the Tribe could establish that the federal
government has extensive control over the resources.  And, based on
the foregoing provisions, it is possible that a court could be persuaded
that the federal government has extensive control over these re-
sources given that the Treaties identify what resources the federal
government is to control, and provide some guidance on how the re-
sources in question are to be managed.  Accordingly, based on the
treaty provisions examined, it would seem the Nez Perce has a poten-
tially stronger claim under the Tucker Act than would the Swinomish
Indian Tribal Community.
The Nez Perce would not be the first tribe to use treaty provisions
as the basis of a breach of federal trust responsibility claim.  Some
tribes have previously asserted a breach of federal trust responsibility
based on a treaty provision, but these tribes have not been successful.
For example, in Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, the Uin-
tah Ute Indians of Utah brought a claim against the United States,
which, in relevant part, claimed the federal government had violated
its trust relationship to the Tribe when it abandoned its use of the
forty-eight acres constituting Fort Douglas and then quitclaimed the
property to the University of Utah.278  In its complaint, the Tribe
brought several claims against the United States.  However, for pur-
poses of this Article, only one of these claims focused on its treaties
with the United States—the Tribe argued that the federal govern-
ment owed it a trust responsibility to the land at issue surrounding
274. Id.
275. 1868 Amendatory Treaty, supra note 61.
276. Id. at art. I.
277. Id. at art. II.
278. Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 768 (1993).
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Fort Douglas.279  In considering the Tribe’s claim, the court first ex-
plained that in order to have a compensable taking the Tribe had to
demonstrate that its claim to aboriginal title was recognized by the
federal government, which it was not.280  The court then considered
whether the treaty at issue created a trust relationship.281  Ulti-
mately, the court concluded the treaty did not create a trust relation-
ship because it failed to designate aboriginal territory, but rather
indicated that the Tribe’s reservation boundaries would be established
at another time.282  Further, the court explained that the treaty only
created a general relationship between the Tribe and the federal
government.283
However, notably, the court did not foreclose the idea that a treaty
could be the source of an enforceable trust relationship.  The court ex-
plained that “[a] trust relationship does not depend for its existence on
express language in a treaty or statute.”284  Also, the court opined
that a trust relationship could have existed once the boundaries were
put in place.285  Accordingly, even though the Tribe ultimately lost its
claim that the treaty established an enforceable trust relationship, the
court did not reject out of hand the idea that a treaty may do so.
B. Potential Application of International Law
Having examined the application of the federal trust responsibility
under domestic law, it is helpful to now consider whether the applica-
tion of international law may assist in determining whether treaties
can be used as a tool to protect tribal resources threatened by climate
change.  Some scholars have concluded that consideration of interna-
tional law is important when determining the scope of treaty
rights.286  As explained below, however, given the sui generis nature
279. Id. at 783 (“As part of its breach of trust action, plaintiff [the Tribe] argues that
the 1849 treaty recognized Indian title and provided for the permissive occupa-
tion by the Government of certain Indian lands on which to build agencies and
military outposts.  These outposts, plaintiff argues, provided benefits to both set-
tlers and Indians by keeping the peace.  Plaintiff posits that the 1849 treaty cre-
ated a trust relationship between the Government and the Uintahs as to those
lands.  Plaintiff urges that the treaty also vested in plaintiff a right to that trust
protection.  In other words, when the Government’s permissive use ceased, the
land would revert to the Indians.”).
280. Id. at 785–88.




285. Id. at 789.
286. See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1625. But cf. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note
11, at 620–23 (arguing tribal treaties are not directly analogous to international
treaties because (1) the United States and tribes did not bargain on equal terms
in the same way that foreign treaties often are; (2) the federal trust responsibility
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of tribal treaties with the United States it is unlikely the international
law of treaties would be directly applicable to the interpretation of
such tribal treaties.  Yet, despite this conclusion, consideration of in-
ternational norms is helpful as such norms may provide direction on
how tribal treaties should be interpreted.
As a starting point, it should be acknowledged that the bedrock of
international law is that nation states are bound to keep their word
under treaties—pacta sunt servanda.287  The British first extended
the international law of treaties to North America through their use of
treaties with various tribes.288  The United States eventually adopted
the British practice, using treaties to solidify political relationships
and, later, to designate pieces of land for Indian occupation.289  As
President George Washington explained to the Senate in 1789:
It is said to be the general understanding and practice of nations, as a check
on the mistakes and indiscretions of ministers or commissioners, not to con-
sider any treaty negotiated and signed by such officers as final and conclusive,
until ratified by the sovereign or government from whom they derive their
powers.  This practice has been adopted by the United States respecting their
treaties with European nations, and I am inclined to think it would be advisa-
ble to observe it in the conduct of our treaties with the Indians . . . .290
Initially, treaties between the United States and tribes were made
largely as equals, given that the status of the fledging United States
was still uncertain.291  These treaties were used to form alliances and
were subject to ratification by the U.S. Senate.292  Chief Justice Mar-
shall explained that these initial treaties were “formed, as near as
may be, on the model of treaties between the crowned heads of
Europe.”293
After the War of 1812, however, this initial period of treaty making
came to a halt.294  What followed was a second phase of treaty mak-
ing, which was marked by treaties of removal—where the federal gov-
ernment sought to remove tribes from their traditional homelands or
is a product of domestic law and not foreign law; and (3) abrogation under inter-
national treaties is different under tribal treaties, and, therefore, tribal treaties
must be treated differently than international treaties).
287. Josef L. Kunz, The Meaning and Range of the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM.
J. INT’L L. 180, 197 (1945) (“Treaties must be complied with.”).
288. Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 570 (1995).
289. Id. at 571–72.
290. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 80–81 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
291. Wiessner, supra note 288, at 575–76.
292. Id.  Interestingly, the Senate concluded that ratification was required, despite
the fact that a committee recommended otherwise. Id. at 582–83.
293. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 550 (1832).
294. Wiessner, supra note 288, at 576–77; Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at
609 (“When the War of 1812 ended and the British withdrew from the Continent,
the tribes lost much of their bargaining leverage.  The negotiations became in-
creasingly onesided.”).
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to greatly constrain the size of tribal lands.295  One scholar explained
that “[g]enerally speaking, treaties of removal appear to often have
been imposed by force or fraud, tainted by corruption or lack of au-
thority by Indian representatives.  Many times they are reported to
have been honored but in the breach . . . .”296  In general, treaty nego-
tiations during the second phase of treaty making suffered from sig-
nificant language barriers, in addition to many allegations of threats
brought by agents of the federal government against tribes.297  Given
this history, a question then arises as to whether such treaties can be
interpreted under international law.
It would appear that international law was originally intended to
apply, as “[n]ot only the Indian Nations, the Executive and the Legis-
lative Branches of the United States Government conducted them-
selves in full accordance with the formalities and contents of
international and domestic law when entering into and approving
those compacts.”298  This conclusion is consistent with Chief Justice
Marshall’s understanding, as he explained in Worcester:
The [C]onstitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be
made to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previ-
ous treaties with the Indian nations and consequently admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making treaties.  The words “treaty”
and “nation” are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and
legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well under-
stood meaning.  We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to
the other nations of the earth.  They are applied to all in the same sense.299
Accordingly, it would seem that the intention at the time treaties
were entered into in the 18th and 19th centuries was that interna-
tional law should apply.300  As Professor Tsosie explained, “[A]s an
historical matter, treaties with Indian nations and treaties with for-
eign nations share a common status: They are negotiated accords be-
295. Wiessner, supra note 288, at 577–79.
296. Id. at 578–79.
297. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 610.  Further, the authors go on to ex-
plain that “Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and agree upon an
exchange of lands in an arm’s-length transaction.  Rather, treaties were imposed
upon them and they had no choice but to consent.” Id. at 611 (citing Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630–31 (1970)).
298. Wiessner, supra note 288, at 582.
299. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559–60 (1832).  Professor Wiessner
explains that “[l]ater case law and administrative judgment confirmed this un-
derstanding.”  Wiessner, supra note 288, at 583 (citation omitted).
300. Notably, Professor Wiessner goes on to explain that treaties between tribes and
the federal government may qualify as international contracts of adhesion, in
which case the treaties would be outside the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and customary international law would apply.  Wiessner, supra note
288, at 597–98.  This argument is beyond the scope of this Article. See also
Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1621 (discussing the differences between international
treaties and treaties between the tribes and the federal government).
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tween separate political sovereigns designed to secure the mutual
advantage of both parties.”301
Some contemporary commentators, however, have argued that
treaties between tribes and the federal government should be treated
differently because Congress has the ability to abrogate treaties with
tribes.302  But the United States can also abrogate international trea-
ties it enters into with subsequent statutes that negate the treaty, as
treaties and statutes have the same normative force under federal
law.303  Accordingly, tribal treaties are no different from international
treaties in this regard.  In fact the U.S. Supreme Court made this
point in its decision in Cherokee Tobacco, when the Court stated:
A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may
supersede a prior treaty.  In the cases referred to these principles were ap-
plied to treaties with foreign nations.  Treaties with Indian nations within the
jurisdiction of the United States, whatever considerations of humanity and
good faith may be involved and require their faithful observance, cannot be
more obligatory.  They have no higher sanctity; and no greater inviolability or
immunity from legislative invasion can be claimed for them.304
Additionally, it may be argued that Congress’s plenary power un-
dermines the idea of treaties between the United States and tribes
being subject to international law.  However, one scholar rejects such
assertions because Congress has used its plenary power in a limited
fashion and applying international law to treaty interpretation is con-
sistent with self-determination.305  Federal courts also treat tribal
treaties differently from international treaties, as is evident from the
development of the Indian canons of construction discussed above.306
As a result, it seems reasonable to conclude that international law
applies in interpreting treaties entered into between the United
States and tribes.307  Given the unique circumstances that gave rise to
the formation of such tribal treaties, the federal courts deemed it nec-
essary to develop a set of rules specifically applicable to the interpre-
tation of such treaties.  The development of such rules, combined with
their continued usage today, is strong evidence that the international
law of treaties does not directly apply to the interpretation of tribal
treaties.
301. Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1620.
302. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
303. Wiessner, supra note 288, at 584
304. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870).
305. Wiessner, supra note 288, at 588–90.
306. For a discussion of the content and origin of the Indian Canons of Construction,
see COHEN, supra note 76, § 2.02.
307. But cf. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11 (arguing that tribes may be treated
better under domestic law than under international law).  However, this discus-
sion of the possible application of international law to tribal treaties is made as
an alternative to the application of domestic law.  Should a tribe not prevail
under domestic law, then it may wish to avail itself of international protections.
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It does not, however, mean that international law has no role in
interpreting tribal treaties.  Accordingly, one may look to human
rights for some guidance.  Discussion of tribes’ treaty rights “inter-
sects with the human rights discourse of international law, which ad-
dresses the rights of minority and ethnic groups within the dominant
society.”308  In fact, “Indigenous groups in the United States and Ca-
nada have begun to use their treaties in international forums as a
means to call attention to the human rights abuses they have suffered
and also to define their political rights vis-a`-vis the nation-states that
colonized their lands.”309
A full discussion of indigenous rights under international law is
beyond the scope of this Article.  However, as a starting point for how
international law views indigenous rights, the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides guidance on how
international law should apply to indigenous peoples across the
globe.310  Notably, several Articles of the Declaration provide that na-
tion-states must provide mechanisms and recourse for indigenous peo-
ple seeking to right wrongs.  Accordingly, tribes may find the
Declaration a useful starting point in determining how their treaty
provisions may be applied under international law.  Moreover, there is
a strong connection between tribes’ assertion of treaty rights and the
right to self-determination.311  The ability to exist as a separate en-
tity, and therefore possess the right to self-determination, is inti-
mately connected to a unique physical space.  Therefore, if space or
land is lost, the right to self-determination may be limited.  The Decla-
ration, as well as other international documents, recognizes the indig-
enous right to self-determination.312  This may be helpful for tribes
looking to effectuate their treaty rights as part of their self-determina-
tion.  Although not the only relevant international document, the Dec-
laration is a helpful place for tribes to start when determining the
scope of their treaty rights under international law.
When considering tribal treaties within the climate change context
the question may arise as to whether the doctrine of rebus sic stan-
tibus or Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
applies.  The international law doctrine of rebus sic stantibus provides
that a party may terminate a treaty due to a fundamental change in
circumstances.313  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is
308. Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1639 (citation omitted).
309. Id. at 1649 (citation omitted).
310. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/
295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
CW2Z-AHFX.
311. Tsosie, supra note 8, at 1645.
312. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 310,
at art. 3.
313. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 533, 566 (1903).
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generally deemed to be a codification of this principle of customary
international law, and in Article 62, the Convention details when an
international treaty may be abrogated on the basis of fundamentally
changed circumstances.314  Within the context of this Article, the fact
that an international treaty may be abrogated on the basis of funda-
mentally changed circumstances then raises two questions: Does the
historical development of the relationship between tribes and the fed-
eral government constitute fundamentally changed circumstances al-
lowing for the abrogation of treaties?  Do the negative consequences of
climate change constitute fundamentally changed circumstances al-
lowing for such treaty abrogation?
As to the first question, the answer is likely no.  Although federal
courts have hinted at the application of rebus sic stantibus in prior
decisions,315 no federal court has actually applied the doctrine or the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to interpret a tribal treaty.
Furthermore, federal courts have generally been less willing to allow
abrogation of tribal treaties than of international treaties.316  Many
federal courts require evidence that Congress explicitly considered the
abrogation of the Indian treaty before such courts will find that it oc-
curred.317  Further, as discussed previously, federal courts developed
specific canons of construction to seemingly avoid the abrogation of
tribal treaties and ensure that such treaties are given the effect un-
derstood by the Indians.318  Such “increased protection of Indian trea-
ties is reasonable given the complex status and history of the
Indians.”319
Furthermore, the fundamental change in conditions required by
both rebus sic stantibus and Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties is rarely met within the context of Indian treaties.
Changing conditions between the tribes and the United States were
foreseen, and, in fact, many of the tribal treaties were designed to en-
courage changed conditions.320  Further, the doctrine requires that
“the effect of the change must be to transform radically the extent of
[treaty] obligations,” and such a high standard has yet to be met in the
tribal treaty context.321  And, finally, in order to evoke the doctrine to
escape its obligations to tribes, the United States must demonstrate
314. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/45WE-PC6J.
315. See, e.g., Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 533.
316. Mike Townsend, Congressional Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation and
Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 793, 798 (1989).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 812.
320. Id. at 809–10.
321. Id.
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that it has “clean hands,”322 and such a showing may be difficult given
the tumultuous historical relationship between the United States and
tribes.
The second question that may arise in relation to potential applica-
tion of this international doctrine is whether the profound negative
impacts of climate change might constitute fundamentally changed
circumstances allowing for treaty abrogation.  Again, the answer is
likely “no.”  In other contexts, international scholars and advocates
have determined that major physical changes only impacted the inter-
pretation of the treaty and not the actual validity of the treaty.323
That is, even in instances where the physical change results in a
coastline shift, it is the view that such dramatic shifts do not consti-
tute fundamentally changed circumstances.  Moreover, in order for
the doctrine to apply in relation to the impacts of climate change, the
United States would need to show that the duty that was impacted
was fundamental to the consent given.324  The treaties focused on in
this Article were negotiated during the second phase of the treaty-
making period; a period when the federal government’s focus was on
removing Indians from settlement and placing them on designated
reservations.  Therefore, because even the most significant impacts of
climate change will not undo such removal and establishment of reser-
vations, it is unlikely that the United States could claim the change
was fundamental to its consent to the treaty.
Ultimately, while international treaty law may not be applied by
federal courts to interpret tribal treaties, it may still prove helpful in
interpreting the scope of federal duties.  Moreover, it is unlikely the
international principles allowing for the abrogation of treaties due to
fundamentally changed circumstances would preclude application of
the treaties discussed above.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the United States, tribes are uniquely threatened by the nega-
tive impacts of climate change.  Tribes and individual Indians are per-
haps more vulnerable to such impacts because of legal, cultural, and
spiritual connections to the land.  Given such vulnerabilities, tribal
advocates are increasingly looking for legal tools that may help dimin-
ish the threat to tribal resources from climate change.  One potential
legal tool may be consideration of a tribe’s treaty rights based on trea-
ties with the United States.  Historically, such treaty rights proved to
322. Id. at 810.
323. See, e.g., Julia Lisztwan, Stability of Maritime Boundary Agreements, 37 YALE J.
INT’L L. 153, 189 (2012) (discussing how nation-states and international actors
viewed Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties within the
maritime context).
324. Id. at 190–91.
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be valuable tools for protecting resources such as water rights and us-
fructuary rights.  The Article considered for the first time whether
such rights might be equally protective in the climate change context.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that some treaty rights may be
more effective tools in easing the negative impacts of climate change
than others.  In reaching this conclusion, the Article considered the
treaties of two tribes, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community and
the Nez Perce.  First, the Article analyzed the actual treaty rights
themselves, demonstrating how some of the treaty rights were more
detailed and perhaps applicable to the climate change context than
other provisions.
The Article also examined how such treaty provisions might be
viewed under both domestic and international law.  Under domestic
law, the analysis focused on whether a tribal treaty provision might be
persuasive as part of a larger claim based on the federal trust relation-
ship.  As with consideration of the treaty rights themselves, it appears
likely that some of the more-detailed tribal provisions might serve as
the basis of a successful claim based on the federal trust relationship.
For example, the treaty between the Nez Perce and the United States
contains specific obligations undertaken by the federal government to
manage certain infrastructure on the reservation and timber.  Such
detailed language and management duties may be interpreted by a
court to constitute an agreement on the part of the federal government
to overtake management and control over the resource at issue.  Fed-
eral courts previously interpreted this sort of affirmative agreement
on the part of the federal government to constitute the basis of an
enforceable trust relationship, even under the more onerous stan-
dards associated with claims based on the Tucker Acts.
And, finally, brief consideration was given to how such treaty
rights might be interpreted under international law.  While interna-
tional treaty law may not be applicable to the interpretation of tribal
treaty rights, an understanding of such law may still prove helpful in
determining rights based on application of human rights law.
Using tribal treaty rights to push for assistance from the federal
government to alleviate the negative impacts of climate change may
not be viable for all tribes, but it is a legal tool that tribes may want to
explore.  Ultimately, use of tribal treaties within the context of climate
change may be a legal example of the idiom, “Everything old is new
again.”
